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Abstract
The relationship between population growth and economic growth is controversial. This article draws on historical data
to chart the links between population growth, growth in per capita output, and overall economic growth over the past
200 years. Low population growth in high-income countries is likely to create social and economic problems while high
population growth in low-income countries may slow their development. International migration could help to adjust these
imbalances but is opposed by many. Drawing on economic analyses of inequality, it appears that lower population growth
and limited migration may contribute to increased national and global economic inequality.
Keywords
economic growth, population growth, economic inequality, productivity, migration

Introduction
The relationship between population growth and growth of
economic output has been studied extensively (Heady &
Hodge, 2009). Many analysts believe that economic growth
in high-income countries is likely to be relatively slow in
coming years in part because population growth in these
countries is predicted to slow considerably (Baker, Delong,
& Krugman, 2005). Others argue that population growth has
been and will continue to be problematic as more people
inevitably use more of the finite resources available on earth,
thereby reducing long-term potential growth (Linden, 2017).
Population growth affects many phenomena such as the age
structure of a country’s population, international migration,
economic inequality, and the size of a country’s work force.
These factors both affect and are affected by overall economic growth. The purpose of this article is to use long-term
historical data and a review of both theoretical and empirical
work on the relationship among growth of population, total
output and per capita output to assess the implications of
their evolution for economic inequality, international migration policies, and general economic growth.
In his important book on inequality, Thomas Piketty
(2014) observes that economic growth “ . . . always includes
a purely demographic component and a purely economic
component, and only the latter allows for an improvement in
the standard of living” (p. 72). Economic growth is measured
by changes in a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
which can be decomposed into its population and economic
elements by writing it as population times per capita GDP.
Expressed as percentage changes, economic growth is equal
to population growth plus growth in per capita GDP. GDP is

a measure of economic output and is also an indicator of
national income which can be defined as total output net of
capital depreciation plus net income from sources outside the
country (Piketty, 2014, p. 45). Piketty (2014, p. 73) points to
evidence that average annual world economic growth
between 1700 and 2012 was 1.6% made up of equal parts
population growth and per capita output growth of 0.8%
each. While these growth rates may appear to be very small,
they can lead to impressive increases over long periods of
time. Population growth at an average annual rate of 0.8%
over the period 1700 to 2015 resulted in a 12-fold increase in
world population from about 600 million in 1700 to over 7.3
billion in 2015 (Maddison, 2001 and World Bank, 2017).
Piketty (2014) develops a number of economic relationships to describe the workings of a capitalist economic system and traces the implications of these relationships for
changes in economic inequality. The relationship between
economic growth and the rate of return to capital is of central
importance in his analysis. He argues that when the rate of
return to capital is greater than the economic growth rate (r >
g in his notation), the likely result will be concentration in
the ownership of capital leading to increasing inequality. In a
later article, Piketty (2015) clarifies this result noting that
other factors as well as economic policies contribute importantly to the evolution of economic inequality, suggesting
1
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that large gaps between r and g will tend to amplify the
effects of these other factors. This qualification does not
diminish the importance of economic growth in Piketty’s
analysis of the causes and consequences of rising inequality.
He argues that economic growth is likely to be relatively
slow in the future, less than the rate of return on capital, in
part because its demographic component is expected to grow
very little. Baker et al. (2005) agree noting that slowing population growth in the United States is part of the reason that
future U.S. economic growth will be lower than it was for
most of the 20th century. Population growth is falling in
many parts of the world and once the demographic transition
is completed in sub-Saharan Africa and other areas of robust
population growth, world population growth will probably
return to historic levels of less than 1% per year. Average
annual growth in per capita output has also been fairly modest over the past 200 years accelerating during periods when
very poor countries begin to catch up with more highly
developed economies or when rapid productivity growth is
achieved as was the case in many countries during the 20th
century. The danger of slow economic growth in Piketty’s
view is that the resulting concentration of capital will help to
bring back the patrimonial capitalism of the 19th century
when one’s fortune was more effectively made by marrying
an heir to great wealth than by working to develop one’s talents in the service of a productive career.
Piketty’s explanation of the importance of economic
growth is not the only possible account, of course. Economic
growth is important for raising living standards around the
world and the role of population growth in the evolution of
living standards is a significant policy issue (see Heady &
Hodge, 2009). In addition to the potential effects of population growth on economic inequality, population and economic growth have significant impacts on such controversial
topics as international migration and global resource use. In
the following sections of the article, the relationships between
population and economic growth are analyzed to assess the
implications of their likely evolution for growing inequality
around the world and for population and migration policies.
There is an extensive literature on these relationships but
little consensus on the actual effects of population on economic growth (Heady & Hodge, 2009). Some authors offer
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence to show that
robust population growth enhances economic growth while
others find evidence to support the opposite conclusion. Still
others find that the effects vary with the level of a country’s
development, the source or nature of the population growth,
or other factors that lead to nonuniform impacts. Heady and
Hodge (2009) point to wide variation in empirical analyses
of the link between population growth and growth in per
capita income due to different methods, control variables,
and other factors. In the next section, statistical evidence on
the long-term evolution of population, per capita output, and
the total economic product for various regions and selected
countries is laid out. This is followed by a review of the
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theoretical and empirical analyses of the role of population in
economic growth and a discussion of the impacts of productivity increases and international migration on economic
growth. The final section summarizes the evidence on the
effects of population growth on economic growth and examines the predictions that long-term economic growth will be
low as countries around the world complete the demographic
transition and the potential for high economic growth from
low-income countries catching up with countries with more
advanced technological capabilities is exhausted.

Statistical Evidence on the Growth of
Population, Per Capita Output, and
GDP
Angus Maddison compiled an extraordinary set of data on
population, per capita GDP, and GDP for virtually all countries in the world from 1 to 2008 of the Common Era (World
Economics, 2016 and Maddison, 2001). After his death in
2010, researchers at the Groningen Growth and Development
Center launched an initiative known as the “Maddison Project”
which seeks to maintain, refine, and update Maddison’s original data set (The Maddison Project, 2013). Clearly, there were
no government agencies collecting data on the national
accounts of countries that may not even have existed in year
one of the Common Era, or in 1700 or 1820 for that matter. As
a result, the estimates recorded in the data sets may be somewhat less reliable than would be the case for more recent statistics. They are, however, consistent with the historical record
and calculated in a uniform manner making them reasonable
estimates of long-term economic trends. The World Bank
(2017) publishes an online database with a great many socioeconomic variables, including population and real GDP, from
1960 to the present for most countries and world regions. Both
statistical sources are used in computing the estimated growth
rates reported in this article. Data on productivity are from the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2016) and the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD; 2016,
2017). Population and migration projections are from the U.S.
Census Bureau (2017). Average annual compound growth
rates are calculated using the formula: V = Aert where V is the
final value, A the initial value, r the rate of growth, t the number of years, and e is the exponential. For example, total world
population in 1960 was 3.04 billion rising to 7.35 billion in
2015, a period of 55 years. Setting A at 3.04 billion, V at 7.35
billion, and t at 55 and solving the formula for r gives an estimate of average annual compound population growth over this
period of 1.61%. All the GDP estimates reported in this study
have been adjusted to remove the effects of inflation. Data collected by Maddison (World Economics, 2016) are in 1990
U.S. dollars while those of the World Bank (2017) are in 2010
U.S. dollars.
Regional groupings in the following tables reflect the
classifications used by Maddison and the World Bank. In
general, high-income countries include the members of the

3

Peterson
Table 1. Average Annual Growth Rates of Population, Per Capita GDP, and GDP, World Regions, 1820 to 1913, 1913 to 2010, and
1820-2010.

Region
Western Europe
Eastern Europe
Former USSR
Western offshootsa
Latin America
Asia
Africa
World

1820-1913
1820-1913 per capita 1820-1913 1913-2010
Population
GDP
GDP
Population
0.73
0.84
1.13
2.47
1.43
0.34
0.26
0.58

0.94
0.60
0.49
1.50
0.97
0.17
0.67
0.83

1.67
1.44
1.62
3.97
2.40
0.51
1.23
1.41

0.47
0.42
0.66
1.29
2.05
1.48
2.17
1.38

1913-2010
per capita
GDP
1.85
1.79
1.70
1.79
1.52
2.28
0.83
1.67

1913-2010 1820-2010
GDP
Population
2.32
2.21
2.36
3.08
3.57
3.76
3.00
3.05

0.60
0.62
0.87
1.84
1.75
0.93
1.38
0.99

1820-2010
per capita 1820-2010
GDP
GDP
1.40
1.21
1.11
1.64
1.25
1.25
0.75
1.26

2.00
1.83
1.98
3.48
3.00
2.18
2.13
2.25

Source. World Economics (2016) and U.S. Census Bureau (2016) for population; The Maddison Project (2013) for per capita GDP growth; and author’s
calculations.
Note. The dates 1820, 1913, and 2010 were chosen because there is more complete country and regional information for those dates in the Maddison
data set. USSR = Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
a
Western offshoots are the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

OECD (Europe, North America, Japan, Korea, Australia,
New Zealand, Israel, and Chile) along with such countries as
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Uruguay, and a number of smaller
island economies. These countries have annual per capita
incomes of $12,476 and above according to World Bank
data. All other countries are considered to be low- and middle-income countries. Geographic regions vary somewhat
across the tables according to whether the data are from the
Maddison project (World Economics, 2016) or the World
Bank (2017). The Maddison data include one group, the
“western offshoots” (United States, Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand) not found in the World Bank data. The precise
make-up of geographic regions and other country classifications used by the World Bank can be found at https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/
articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups
Average annual compound growth rates for population,
real GDP, and real per capita GDP in various regions and
countries from 1820 to 2010 are shown in Tables 1 and 2.
Average annual world population growth over this period
was about 1% but has varied considerably across regions and
over time. Europe and the countries formerly included in the
Soviet Union had relatively slow population growth overall
with levels that were lower in the 20th century than in the
19th. One reason for slower population growth in Europe
was the substantial emigration to Latin America and the
“western offshoots” where high population growth rates
were recorded between 1820 and 1913. While European
population growth rates slowed during the period 1913 to
2010, they accelerated somewhat in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. Note that a constant annual population growth rate
of 1% means that population doubles every 69.3 years. World
population in 1820 was just over a billion people compared
with about 6.9 billion in 2010 (World Economics, 2016 and
World Bank, 2017). The results reported in Table 1 can shed

light on the timing of the demographic transition in various
parts of the world. The demographic transition consists of an
initial phase during which both crude birth and mortality
rates are high and population growth is slow. As societies
modernize, mortality rates fall while birth rates remain high
leading to high population growth rates. Eventually, birth
rates begin to decline resulting in a return to lower population growth as the transition is completed. This process
appears to have run its course in Europe by the beginning of
the 20th century and somewhat later in the western offshoots,
while many countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America
have yet to complete it.
Average annual growth of per capita GDP also increased
during the period 1913 to 2010 which, when combined with
generally higher population growth rates, led to significant
overall economic growth, over 3% per year for the world as
a whole. The more recent acceleration of economic growth
in China and other emerging economies can be seen in
Tables 3 and 4 covering the period 1960 to 2015. Economic
growth in the high-income countries of Western Europe and
North America over this period has been a little less than
the world average while growth in Asia has been well above
the global average over the past 55 years. Population
growth has slowed everywhere except sub-Saharan Africa
but still accounted for almost half of world economic
growth over the period 1990-2015. The emerging Asian
economies are catching up with the high-income countries,
registering significant growth in per capita GDP with population growth contributing relatively little to overall economic growth. In China, for example, average annual
population growth between 1990 and 2015 was only 0.76%,
perhaps as a result of that country’s former policy of limiting families to one child, while average annual per capita
GDP growth was 8.72% for an overall economic growth
rate of 9.48% per year. Similar results are found for India
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Table 2. Average Annual Growth of Population, Real Per Capita GDP, and Real GDP (Percent), Selected Countries, 1820 to 1913 and
1913 to 2010.
Country
France
Germany
Italy
Norway
United Kingdom
Former USSRa
Canada
United States
Mexico
Japan
Korea
India
China
Indonesia
Iran
Jordan
Iraq
Brazil
Argentina
Ghana
Morocco
Egypt
South Africa
World

Population
1820-1913

Per capita GDP
1820-1913

GDP
1820-1913

Population
1913-2010

Per capita GDP
1913-2010

GDP
1913-2010

0.30
1.03
0.66
0.99
0.82
1.13
2.43
2.45
0.88
0.55
0.13
0.40
0.15
1.14
0.56
0.51
0.42
1.78
2.86
0.60
0.69
1.14
1.48
0.54

1.21
1.31
0.45
1.20
0.93
0.77
1.71
1.46
1.09
0.78
0.40
0.25
-0.01
0.54
0.57
0.57
0.57
0.18
1.40
1.34
0.54
0.69
0.82
0.83

1.51
2.34
1.11
2.19
1.75
1.89
4.14
3.91
1.97
1.33
0.53
0.65
0.14
1.68
1.13
1.08
0.99
1.96
4.30
1.94
1.23
1.83
2.30
1.37

0.47
0.24
0.48
0.71
0.33
1.36
1.51
1.19
2.13
0.94
1.59
1.44
1.15
1.59
1.97
2.98
2.48
2.19
1.74
2.55
1.89
1.97
2.18
1.40

1.87
1.79
2.15
2.51
1.62
0.47
1.78
1.80
1.54
2.85
3.92
1.66
2.76
1.74
1.92
1.78
0.49
2.20
1.02
0.93
1.79
1.60
1.19
1.67

2.34
2.03
2.63
3.22
1.95
1.83
3.29
2.99
3.67
3.79
5.51
3.10
3.91
3.33
3.89
4.76
2.97
4.39
2.76
3.48
3.68
3.57
3.37
3.07

Source. Author’s calculation based on data from World Economics (2016) and The Maddison Project (2013).
Note. USSR = Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
a
Countries formerly included in the USSR.

Table 3. Average Annual Growth of Population, Real GDP, and Real Per Capita GDP (Percent), Regions, EU, and United States, 1960
to 2015, and 1990 to 2015.
Region
World
Low and middle income
High-income countries
East Asia, Pacific
South Asia
Middle East and North Africa
Latin America
Sub-Sahara Africa
North America
EU
United States

Population
1960-2015

Per capita GDP
1960-2015

1.61
1.81
0.81
1.49
2.03
2.48a
1.85
2.69
1.07
0.40
1.03

1.85
2.77
2.28
5.45
2.97
1.53a
1.79
0.78
1.99
2.26
2.01

GDP
1960-2015
3.46
4.58
3.09
6.94
5.00
4.01a
3.64
3.47
3.06
2.66
3.04

Population
1990-2015

Per capita GDP
1990-2015

GDP
1990-2015

1.32
1.46
0.68
0.95
1.73
2.03
1.40
2.71
1.01
0.26
0.98

1.42
3.04
1.37
7.05
4.25
1.82
1.53
1.10
1.38
1.38
1.40

2.74
4.50
2.05
8.00
5.98
3.85
2.93
3.81
2.39
1.64
2.38

Source. Author’s calculations based on data from World Bank (2017).
Note. EU = European Union.
a
1970 to 2015.

and Indonesia although population growth in these countries has been much higher than in China (Table 4).

It is also interesting to note the more recent acceleration
of per capita economic growth in developing countries. For
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Table 4. Average Annual Growth of Population, Real Per Capita GDP, Real GDP (Percent), Selected Countries, 1960-2015.
Country
France
Austria
Italy
Norway
United Kingdom
Turkey
Canada
United States
Mexico
Australia
Japan
Korea
India
China
Indonesia
Iran
Brazil
Argentina
Honduras
Algeria
Nigeria
Kenya
South Africa
World

Population
1960-2015

Per capita GDP
1960-2015

GDP
1960-2015

Population
1990-2015

Per capita GDP
1990-2015

GDP
1990-2015

0.65
0.37
0.35
0.67
0.39
1.91
1.27
1.03
2.18
1.53
0.58
1.28
1.95
1.31
1.96
2.33
1.91
1.35
2.54
2.32
2.53
3.16
2.09
1.61

2.10
2.35
2.06
2.46
1.97
2.43
1.89
2.01
1.72
1.89
3.04
5.68
3.16
6.41
3.44
1.56
2.16
1.32
1.39
1.21
1.23
1.36
0.98
1.85

2.75
2.72
2.41
3.13
2.36
4.34
3.16
3.04
3.90
3.42
3.62
6.96
5.11
7.72
5.40
3.89
4.07
2.67
3.93
3.53
3.76
4.52
3.07
3.46

0.53
0.44
0.28
0.85
0.52
1.51
1.02
0.98
1.58
1.33
0.11
0.66
1.64
0.76
1.40
1.37
1.29
1.13
2.00
1.71
2.58
2.71
1.79
1.32

0.95
1.38
0.36
1.59
1.49
2.30
1.26
1.40
1.10
1.70
0.77
4.18
4.69
8.72
3.37
1.94
1.38
2.68
1.71
1.20
2.48
0.80
0.71
1.42

1.48
1.82
0.64
2.44
2.01
3.81
2.28
2.38
2.68
3.03
0.88
4.84
6.33
9.48
4.77
3.31
2.67
3.81
3.71
2.91
5.06
3.51
2.50
2.74

Source. Author’s calculations based on World Bank (2017) data.

the decade of the 1990s, annual growth in per capita output
in these countries averaged 1.37% compared with a rate of
4.15% for the period 2000-2015 (Table 5). These results are
undoubtedly influenced by the exceptional economic performance in China and other large emerging economies although
economic growth also picked up in many low-income countries. Population growth slowed slightly between these two
periods in all regions except Sub-Saharan Africa where negative growth in per capita GDP during the 1990s shifted to a
much higher rate of 2.29% for the period 2000 to 2015 and
an overall economic growth rate for this period of almost
5%. Per capita GDP growth increased substantially in Asia
and somewhat less in Latin America between these two periods. The 1990s were a particularly difficult period for Russia
where population declines and low growth of per capita GDP
combined to generate negative average annual economic
growth. Life expectancy at birth in Russia fell from 69.5
years in 1988 to 64.5 years in 1994 only returning to its previous high in 2011 after which it seems to have stabilized at
70.4 years. For comparison, life expectancy at birth in Japan
in 2015 was 83.6 years and in the United States it was 78.9
years (World Bank, 2017). Although population continued to
decline in Russia after 2000, per capita output rebounded
significantly leading to overall annual average economic
growth of 3.53%. High-income countries, in contrast,

registered slower growth after 2000 than in the preceding
decade. The effects of the Great Recession of 2008-2009
appear to be reflected in the lower per capita growth rates for
the period 2000-2015 in the United States, Japan, and most
European countries (Table 5).
Piketty (2014), Milanovic (2016), and Atkinson (2014),
among others, have noted that economic inequality declined
during much of the 20th century only to begin rising after
1975. In explaining these trends, Piketty (2014) points to the
30 years after World War II (“les Trente Glorieuses,” p. 11)
as a period of exceptionally high economic growth. Average
annual population, GDP, and per capita GDP growth rates are
shown for selected countries for the period 1945 to 1975 in
Table 6. World economic growth over this period at 3.79%
was higher than the average rates for the past 200 years
(2.25%) or for the period 1913 to 2010 (3.05%). France,
Spain, Italy, the Soviet Union, Turkey, Japan, South Korea,
Mexico, and Brazil were able to realize very rapid growth
between 1945 and 1975. In the case of France, Italy, the
Soviet Union, and Japan, much of this growth was driven by
rebuilding after the destruction of the war years. In many
Western European countries, population growth rates were
low but higher growth in per capita output led to substantial
overall economic growth during this period. These higher
growth rates meant that Piketty’s inequality, r > g, was
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Table 5. Average Annual Percentage Growth of Population, Real Per Capita GDP, and Real GDP (2010 US$), World Regions and
Selected Countries, 1990 to 2000 and 2000 to 2015.
Region/country
Low-income
High-income
World
East Asia/Pacific
South Asia
Middle East/North Africa
Latin America
Sub-Sahara Africa
North America
United States
EU
China
Brazil
India
Russia
South Africa
Japan
Germany
France
United Kingdom
Norway
South Korea

Population
1990-2000

Per capita GDP
1990-2000

Real GDP
1990-2000

1.64
0.70
1.46
1.64
2.02
2.14
1.65
2.72
1.22
1.20
0.21
1.11
1.60
1.90
−0.68
2.29
0.24
0.37
0.33
0.34
0.69
0.89

1.37
1.90
1.29
1.91
2.86
1.08
1.42
−0.67
2.11
2.18
2.02
8.82
0.95
3.54
0.28
−0.49
0.88
1.59
1.75
2.06
2.87
5.44

3.01
2.67
2.75
3.55
4.88
3.22
3.07
2.05
3.33
3.38
2.23
9.93
2.55
5.44
−0.40
1.80
1.12
1.96
2.08
2.40
3.56
6.33

Population
2000-2015
1.34
0.66
1.22
0.72
1.53
1.97
1.23
2.70
0.88
0.86
0.29
0.55
1.11
1.46
−0.14
1.49
0.01
−0.01
0.63
0.65
0.96
0.54

Per capita GDP
2000-2015

Real GDP
2000-2015

4.15
0.98
1.51
3.65
5.00
2.13
1.60
2.29
0.89
0.90
0.95
8.62
1.64
5.47
3.67
1.47
0.71
1.11
0.45
1.10
0.63
3.32

5.49
1.64
2.73
4.37
6.53
4.10
2.83
4.99
1.77
1.76
1.24
9.17
2.75
6.93
3.53
2.96
0.72
1.10
1.08
1.75
1.59
3.86

Source. Author’s calculations using World Bank (2017) data.
Note. EU = European Union.

reversed contributing to a reduction of the concentration of
capital and declining levels of inequality. Piketty (2014) estimates the “pure” rate of return to capital, defined as the
observed rate of return minus an estimate of the costs of
managing investment portfolios, to have been 4% to 5% in
the 19th century declining to 3% to 4% today with substantial variation from country to country. In many of the countries shown in Table 6, economic growth rates were
substantially higher than these estimates of the rate of return
on capital and in several cases, high population growth contributed significantly to overall economic growth.
A striking feature of the estimates in the Tables is that,
with the exception of the immediate postwar period, economic growth in the United States has been slightly more
rapid than in most Western European countries both in the
19th and early 20th centuries when it was catching up to the
more advanced European economies and in more recent
years. From 1960 to 2015, for example, the U.S. economy
grew at an annual rate of 3.04% compared with 2.66% for the
European Union (EU). If the United States and EU are both
set at 100 in 1960, these growth rates mean that the United
States would end up in 2015 at 532 compared with 432 for
the EU, an advantage of about 23%. Note, however, that the
reason for this difference is not that the United States had
greater growth in per capita output but rather that U.S.

population growth was higher. In fact, per capita GDP growth
in the EU outpaced that of the United States where economic
growth would have averaged 2.41% instead of 3.04% if the
U.S. population had increased at the same rate as that of the
EU. Does this mean that countries with higher population
growth rates will benefit from greater overall economic
growth potentially mitigating the effects on inequality that
concern Piketty? This question is the subject of the next
section.

The Relationship Between Economic
Growth and Population Growth
If population growth and per capita GDP growth are completely independent, higher population growth rates would
clearly lead to higher economic growth rates. It would still be
true that, as noted by Piketty (2014), only the growth in per
capita GDP would give rise to improvements in economic
well-being. On the other hand, if population growth affects
per capita output growth, higher population growth rates
would contribute to either higher or lower overall economic
growth depending on the nature of its effects on per capita
GDP. For the world as a whole, over the period 1990 to 2015,
the correlation between population growth and real per capita GDP growth, based on World Bank (2017) data, was
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Table 6. Average Annual Growth of Population, Real Per Capita GDP, and Real GDP, Selected Countries, 1945 to 1975.
Country
France
Germany
Hungary
Italy
Norway
Switzerland
Spain
United Kingdom
Former USSR
Canada
United States
Australia
Japan
South Korea
Mexico
Brazil
China
India
Turkey
Egypta
Nigeriaa
South Africaa
Worlda

Population growth (%)

Real per capita GDP growth (%)

Real GDP growth (%)

1.02
0.54
0.51
0.69
0.87
1.24
0.94
0.45
1.27
2.09
1.43
2.08
1.27
2.26
3.13
2.86
1.81
1.30
2.56
1.85
2.35
2.14
1.59

5.39
3.27
4.05
5.74
3.75
2.66
4.60
1.73
3.88
2.32
1.10
2.15
7.11
5.11
2.94
3.68
2.13
1.00
4.12
1.49
1.81
1.74
2.20

6.41
3.81
4.56
6.43
4.62
3.90
5.54
2.18
5.15
4.41
2.53
4.23
8.38
7.37
6.07
6.54
3.94
2.30
6.68
3.34
4.16
3.88
3.79

Source. Author’s calculations based on World Economics (2016), The Maddison Project (2013), and United Nations (2016).
Note. USSR = Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
a
1950 to 1975.

–0.1849 suggesting that these two variables were uncorrelated during that period. Simple correlation, of course, tells
us very little about the actual relationship between these variables. It turns out that economists have developed theoretical
arguments supporting both the idea that population growth
slows growth in per capita output and the opposite idea that
population growth stimulates greater economic growth.
Thomas Malthus (1993) developed one of the earliest and
best known theories showing that population growth has a
negative effect on well-being. He believed that population
has a tendency to grow more rapidly than food supplies so
that population reductions through various types of misery
are always required to keep the number of people at a level
consistent with the amount of food available. The implication of Malthus’s model is that average incomes will always
be driven down by population growth to a level that is just
adequate for the population’s subsistence.
A major purpose of Malthus’s essay was to argue against
the English Poor Laws. He suggested that trying to increase
the well-being of the poor was an exercise in futility as higher
incomes would lead to population increases that would drive
incomes back down to the subsistence level. This understanding represented an accurate image of the past but missed
the boat entirely for the future. From 1000 to 1820, average

annual population growth in England was about 0.29% while
per capita GDP growth averaged 0.12% for an overall average annual economic growth rate of 0.41% according to data
from World Economics (2016). With the Industrial
Revolution, however, both income and population growth
began to increase as did the supplies of food. Growth in
global agricultural output has been faster than world population growth over the past two centuries (Peterson, 2009) and
real per capita GDP in England has increased more than
11-fold since 1820 (The Maddison Project, 2013). The fact
that technological innovations have allowed incomes to rise
well above the subsistence levels familiar to Malthus does
not mean, however, that the question of how population
growth affects growth in per capita output is resolved. It is
still possible that growth in output would have been greater
if population growth rates had been somewhat lower. In fact,
population growth in the United Kingdom between 1820 and
2010 was moderately higher at 0.57% than was the case for
the previous 820 years while annual growth in per capita
GDP was substantially more rapid at 1.28% after 1820
(World Economics, 2016 and The Maddison Project, 2013).
Malthusian perspectives on the effects of population
growth on social and economic well-being were revived by
Paul Ehrlich (1968) and others in the latter part of the 20th
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century when population growth rates reached very high levels, primarily in low-income countries. The concern of these
writers was that world population would reach a level that
would overwhelm the capacity of the earth and its resources
to generate the food and other goods needed for human life.
Many felt that both population growth and economic growth
needed to be scaled back or eliminated entirely to avoid an
existential crisis. Other authors argued that fears about population growth were overblown suggesting that population
growth would stimulate technological innovations that
would allow food production to keep up with the growing
population (Boserup, 1965) or that larger populations would
result in more brains that could be applied to solving any
resource problems that might arise (Simon, 1981). In 1980,
Julian Simon and Ehrlich made a famous bet on the future
prices of five mineral commodities over the following 10
years with Ehrlich predicting rising prices as the world population exploded while Simon forecast the opposite as clever
humans found ways to overcome resource constraints. Simon
won the bet as the commodity prices fell substantially while
the world added 800 million people to its population (Sabin,
2014). As population growth rates have begun to fall in
recent years, the possibility that food and natural resources
will be exhausted by a larger population seems to be less of a
preoccupation than the more likely danger that continued use
of the earth’s resources at current rates will lead to climate
change and other environmental problems.
The neoclassical growth model pioneered by Solow
(1956) also provides a theoretical explanation for a negative
relationship between population growth and growth in per
capita output. Models of this nature are often referred to as
“exogenous” growth models because the two variables that
drive economic growth, savings (which lead to increases in
the capital stock) and population (which determines the
amount of labor available), are introduced exogenously. In
these models, rapid population growth leads to smaller
amounts of capital per worker slowing economic growth
(Bucci, 2015). In addition, it is generally assumed that
increasing population combined with relatively static growth
in the capital stock gives rise to diminishing returns. Note
that most theoretical economic growth models do not actually use population as a factor in economic output. Instead,
the size of the labor force (number of workers often adjusted
for the average hours worked by each worker) is the variable
that is combined with capital to generate GDP. In most cases,
however, the population growth rate appears to be taken as a
measure of labor force growth although more sophisticated
models also take account of labor quality and the structure of
the labor force. For example, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil
(1990) add human capital accumulation which enhances the
quality of the labor force to Solow’s model and find that
empirical evidence is consistent with the theoretical result
that higher population growth rates lead to lower steady-state
economic growth while higher savings rates have the opposite effect.
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Early empirical applications of the neoclassical growth
model found that after accounting for the effects of labor and
capital in economic growth, there remained a large residual
thought to be associated with technological progress
(Shackleton, 2013). Endogenous growth models were developed to provide a better explanation of this residual by
including representations of research and development and
altering some of the assumptions about diminishing returns
to capital as labor supply increases (Todaro & Smith, 2012).
An interesting result from early efforts to model endogenous
growth is that these models often suggest that there is a positive relationship between population growth and per capita
economic growth in contrast to the predictions of the neoclassical growth models. Such an outcome is consistent with
arguments advanced by Simon (1990) who suggested that
greater population growth would result in a larger “stock of
useful knowledge” (p. 168) which would, in turn, foster
greater per capita economic growth. Jones (1999) identifies
three types of endogenous growth models noting that early
versions resulted in the prediction that population growth
would generate increased per capita GDP growth claiming,
in contrast to Simon, that this result is at odds with the empirical evidence. The other types of endogenous growth models
described by Jones also predicted a positive relationship
between population and per capita economic growth although
there have been several representations that allow for a negative correlation between these variables (see Strulik, 2005
and Prettner & Prskawetz, 2010). Most of these authors
believe that empirical evidence does not support the idea that
population growth is positively correlated with per capita
output growth (Strulik, 2005).
Empirical work on the effects of population growth on
economic growth in particular countries has generated contradictory results. Sethy and Sahoo (2015) and Tumwebaze
and Ijjo (2015) find that population growth has a positive
impact on per capita economic growth in India and the
Eastern and Southern Africa region. In contrast, Yao,
Kinugasa, and Hamori (2013) and Banerjee (2012) conclude
that there is a negative relationship between population and
per capita GDP growth in China and Australia. Huang and
Xie (2013) find that current population growth has a negative
effect on economic growth while lagged population growth
has a positive effect so that there is no long-term relationship
between these variables. Such contradictory findings have
led several analysts to consider the possibility that the impact
of population growth on per capita output growth may not be
uniform but, rather, varies with particular circumstances. For
example, Becker et al. (1999) suggest that population growth
in low-income, agricultural societies slows growth in per
capita income due to diminishing returns to the growing
labor force making more intensive use of a fixed resource
base while a growing population in high-income, urban
economies may give rise to greater income growth as a result
of increasing returns from greater specialization and growth
in investments in human capital. Bucci (2015) points to
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positive effects of population growth on productivity due to
greater specialization but suggests that larger populations
give rise to more complex production processes that offset
these effects. Kelley and Schmidt (2001) and Mierau and
Turnovsky (2014) argue that population growth stemming
from declining mortality rates stimulates economic growth
while population growth resulting from fertility increases
will tend to slow it. The reason for these contrasting effects
is that declines in mortality provide incentives for people to
save more which stimulates growth while increases in fertility have a negative impact on aggregate savings (Mierau &
Turnovsky, 2014). In a meta-analysis of studies of economic
growth and population growth, Heady and Hodge (2009)
found that declining population growth rates in high-income
countries slow economic growth while high population
growth rates in low-income countries lower their economic
growth.
Several analysts have investigated the relationship
between population and per capita output growth by taking
advantage of the natural experiment provided by the postWorld War II baby boom in the United States, Canada,
Australia, and much of Western Europe. Baby booms are
characterized by relatively short periods of increased fertility
which can lead to greater population growth. In the United
States, the U.S. Census Bureau counts the baby boom as lasting from July 1, 1946 to July 1, 1964 (Colby & Ortman,
2014). During this period, the average annual U.S. population growth rate was 1.70% which is higher than the average
of 1.29% for the 20th century as a whole. Per capita GDP
growth for these years was 1.82%, about the same as the
average annual growth rate of 1.87% for the period 1946 to
2010 (The Maddison Project, 2013). Yoo (1994) develops
three models to examine the impact of this increase in population growth on U.S. economic growth. He finds that the
large increase in the number of children slowed growth as
resources were transferred from more productive activities to
education and health care for this large cohort. Once the baby
boom generation moved from the dependency stage to the
more productive phase of active workers and savers, standards of living improved and even when the baby boomers
exit the labor force, his models suggest that the decline in
savings will have little impact on economic well-being.
Bloom and Canning (2004) also show that there are positive
impacts on economic growth as baby boom cohorts join the
labor force and save for retirement. Many of these authors
emphasize the importance of age structure for economic
development. High population growth rates mean that the
average age of a population will be young and there will be
high dependency rates. Forty-three percent of the population
in sub-Saharan Africa, where population is growing 2.7%
per year, is under the age of 15 while only 3% is over 65. In
Japan, where population growth is negative, 13% of the population is under age 15 with 26% over 65 (World Bank,
2017). As dependents, the large number of children in subSaharan Africa will slow growth but once they enter the

labor force, these countries can expect to reap a “demographic dividend” that will enhance economic growth. This
dividend could be diminished if countries in sub-Saharan
Africa do not complete the demographic transition to lower
population growth rates in coming years.
There appears to be some agreement in the literature that
population growth and growth in per capita output are not
independent and the most likely nature of the relationship
between them seems to be that it depends very much on the
particular circumstances, notably the age structure of the
population, in the various countries and regions. The aging
population in countries like Japan means that a relatively
smaller cohort of working age people will be called upon to
support growing numbers of retirees slowing economic
growth unless there is a substantial rise in productivity and
per capita output. A different type of dependency problem
exists in many African countries where relatively small
working-age populations are required to support the very
large number of children who have important educational
and health needs. In the future, these children will enter the
labor force and economic growth should increase. Trajectories
of population growth do not tend to include large and dramatic turning points so it is unlikely that the population
trends in various parts of the world can be significantly
altered in the short run by policy changes. As a result, the
effect of population growth on per capita economic growth
will probably remain highly country specific although population policies may have some longer-term effects on population growth and age structure.

Productivity, Migration, and Economic
Growth
While the effects of population growth on per capita economic growth may be quite variable, productivity growth is
unequivocally related to the “economic component” of
growth that Piketty points to as the source of improvements
in the standard of living. As noted earlier, the services of
capital and labor do not explain economic growth in its
entirety. The part not explained by these inputs, the “Solow
residual,” is often referred to as multifactor productivity
(MFP). It is a measure of the effects of technological change,
increases in efficiency, and other economic effects that may
influence output such as increasing returns to scale or
changes in the allocation of resources (Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 2016). To measure MFP, it is necessary to determine the value of total output (GDP) and the contribution of
the combined inputs, capital and labor, with MFP calculated
as the amount of output that can be obtained from a unit of
the combined inputs (OECD, 2016, pp. 101-102). MFP and
per capita economic growth are distinct concepts but may be
correlated, in part, perhaps, because the same variable (GDP)
is in the numerator of both. Piketty (2014) sometimes treats
per capita economic growth and productivity growth as
interchangeable. Shackleton (2013) estimates that average
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Table 7. Real Average Annual Per Capita GDP Growth and
Correlation Coefficients Between Real Per Capita GDP Growth
and Multifactor Productivity Growth, Selected OECD Members,
1990-2015.

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea
Netherlands
New Zealand
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States

Per capita GDP
growth (%)

Correlation
coefficient

1.69
1.37
1.24
1.27
1.19
1.20
1.02
1.34
4.08
0.38
0.87
4.18
1.47
1.48
1.10
1.22
1.54
0.67
1.45
1.41

0.5845
0.3302
0.1078
0.7977
0.7251
0.8468
0.7612
0.9121
0.7781
0.6647
0.9190
0.6896
0.7167
0.5821
0.7604
−0.0648
0.8445
0.8267
0.7993
0.4038

Source. Author’s calculations based on World Bank (2017) data for real
per capita GDP growth and OECD data at http://www.oecd.org/std/
productivity-stats/ for multifactor productivity growth.
Note. OECD = Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development.

annual growth in U.S. MFP over the period 1870 to 2010 was
between 1.6% and 1.8% which is about the same as average
annual growth of per capita GDP over that period (1.8%)
based on the Maddison Project (2013) data. Correlation coefficients for per capita GDP and MFP growth for the period
1990 to 2014 based on OECD (2017) data for the OECD
countries for which data are available are shown in Table 7.
The correlation is quite strong in Germany and Japan but
there is no apparent correlation in Belgium and Spain.
Overall, these results suggest that per capita GDP growth is
not a perfect proxy for MFP growth in these countries in
recent years.
The evolution of MFP over time follows the business
cycle closely (OECD, 2016). During the recession of 20082009, both MFP and per capita GDP growth rates were negative in all but a few OECD countries (OECD, 2017). The
OECD (2016) suggests that MFP typically increases when
the economy is expanding but declines when it is contracting. Comin (2006) argues that over the long term, productivity growth is driven by technological innovation making the
factors that influence innovation such as patent policies or
spending on research critically important for economic
growth in the future. Gordon (2016) argues that economic

growth between 1870 and 1970 reflected a revolutionary
change in the way human beings live and work as a result of
a set of transformative inventions such as electricity generation and the internal combustion engine. He feels that more
recent advances in information technology and communications will not have the same kind of effects as these earlier
innovations and predicts that future economic growth will be
lower than it was during the special century of revolutionary
inventions. Shackleton (2013) is somewhat more optimistic
noting that the full effects of technological innovations often
are only seen many years after their introduction so that
recent advances in information and communications technologies may yet translate into increased economic growth.
Although growth in per capita GDP in the high-income countries did appear to slow down after 2000, it increased in many
low- and middle-income countries (see Table 5).
There appears to be some agreement among economists
not only that productivity growth has slowed since 2000 in
high-income countries but also that there is little prospect for
a reversal of this trend. Irwin (2016) and Baker et al. (2005)
point to falling labor forces as the baby boom generation
retires and workers choose to work fewer hours coupled with
lower per capita output growth as causes of slower GDP
growth. Gordon (2016) notes the same types of demographic
changes as these authors and argues that stagnation in educational attainment, inequality, and government debt will
largely offset the effects of any potential technological innovations. He predicts that average annual per capita GDP
growth in the United States will be only 0.8% over the period
2015 to 2040, far lower than the average growth rate of
2.11% (Gordon’s estimate) achieved between 1920 and
2014. One factor that might help to offset the forces giving
rise to predictions of slow economic growth is international
migration. The U.S. Census Bureau (2017) estimates that
crude birth and mortality rates in the EU are about equal at
10 per thousand people suggesting that the natural rate of
population growth is zero. With net migration at two per
thousand people, the EU did realize a positive population
growth rate of 0.2%. In contrast, deaths in Japan outnumbered births and with virtually no net migration, the country
had a negative population growth rate of –0.2% in 2016. For
the United States, the 2016 population growth is estimated at
0.8% made up of equal parts natural increase (crude birth
rate of 12 per thousand and crude mortality rate of 8 per
thousand) and net migration (4 per thousand). The U.S.
Census Bureau (2017) predicts that natural population
increases in the United States will continue to decline while
net migration remains fairly constant. By 2040, the Census
Bureau estimates that annual population growth will fall to
0.5% based on a natural increase of 0.1% (crude birth rate of
11 per thousand and crude mortality rate of 10 per thousand)
coupled with an increase of 0.4% (four per thousand) due to
immigration.
In recent years, there has been a fairly steady flow of
migrants primarily from low- and moderate-income
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Table 8. Net Migration (2012) and Foreign-Born Population (Total and Percent, 2015), World Regions and Selected Countries.
Regions/countries
World
Low- and moderate-income countries
High-income countries
East Asia/Pacific
South Asia
Middle East/North Africa
Latin America
Sub-Sahara Africa
North America
Europe/Central Asia
China
India
Pakistan
Syria
Turkey
Saudi Arabia
Brazil
Russia
South Africa
Japan
Germany
France
United Kingdom
Norway
United States

Net migration
(000) 2012

Total foreign-born
Population (000), 2015

Foreign-born population as %
of total population, 2015

0.0
−15,350.7
15,359.6
−1,457.5
−6,280.8
−213.0
−2,081.9
−1,689.0
6,183.8
5,547.4
−1,800.0
−2,598.2
−1,081.9
−4,030.0
2,000.0
850.0
15.9
1,117.9
600.0
350.0
1,250.0
331.6
900.0
235.7
5,007.9

243,700.2
103,218.3
140,482.0
25,565.3
14,103.7
40,278.5
9,234.0
18,994.0
54,488.7
81,539.4
4,159.4
5,241.0
3,629.0
875.2
2,964.9
10,185.9
713.6
11,643.3
3,142.5
2,043.9
12,005.7
7,784.4
8,543.1
741.8
46,627.1

3.3
1.7
11.2
1.1
0.8
8.4
1.5
2.0
15.2
10.1
0.3
0.4
1.9
4.7
3.8
32.3
0.3
8.1
5.8
1.6
14.9
12.1
13.2
14.2
14.5

Source. Net Migration from World Bank (2017); foreign-born population, United Nations (2017).

countries to high-income countries as shown in Table 8. In
2012, about 15 million people emigrated from low- and
moderate-income countries while high-income countries
received about an equal number. There is some migration
among the low- and moderate-income countries but the
main flows are to Europe and North America as well as
such regional magnets as South Africa. According to
United Nations (2017) data, 3.3% of the world population
lives in countries that are not the countries in which they
were born (Table 8). Many small island states such as the
Cayman Islands (39.6% foreign-born) or the Falklands
(54.1%) have large proportions of foreign-born residents
as do countries with limited land areas such as Singapore
(45.4%) and Liechtenstein (61.1%). The Persian Gulf
states are classified as high-income countries by the World
Bank and have unusually large foreign-born populations.
Foreign-born residents make up 51.1% of the population
of Bahrain, 73.6% of the population of Kuwait, 88.4% in
the United Arab Emirates, and 32.3% in Saudi Arabia.
Connor (2016) suggests that economic growth in these
countries and the availability of short-term work visas
have attracted large numbers of migrants with the number
of foreign-born residents growing by 61% between 2005
and 2015.

Despite the fact that foreign-born residents make up a little more than 10% of the populations in all high-income
countries, the flow of migrants into these countries does not
appear to be great enough to significantly raise population
growth rates. Slowing population growth in high-income
countries not only means lower economic growth rates but
also an increased burden on the working population to support the growing numbers of retirees. Immigration increases
the working age population thereby easing the burden of supporting a large elderly population. In line with some of the
arguments sketched earlier, higher population growth may be
beneficial in high-income countries where there is currently
a tendency for population growth rates to decline. In contrast, many populous low-income countries, particularly in
sub-Saharan Africa, would probably be better off with lower
population growth (Becker et al., 1999). International migration could play a positive role in adjusting these imbalances.
In 2016, population growth in Somalia was estimated to be
2.0% with the high natural rate of increase (2.7%) reduced
by a net migration rate of seven per thousand (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2017). For all of sub-Saharan Africa, net migration
had a much smaller impact, reducing the population growth
rate from its natural level of 2.5% to 2.4% in 2016. Likewise,
The U.S. Census Bureau (2017) estimated that population
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growth in the least-developed countries in 2016 was only
reduced from 2.3% to 2.2% by emigration. Hanson and
McIntosh (2016) argue that there will be little change in the
impact of emigration from Africa, predicting that it will
siphon off only a small proportion of the estimated population increase between 2010 and 2050.
These observations suggest that there could be benefits in
both high- and low-income countries of more open borders
to allow increased migration. Branko Milanovic (2016, p.
143) argues that realizing the full benefits of globalization
requires the free movement of goods, services, technology,
and ideas as well as the exchange of such productive inputs
as labor and capital. He notes that much progress has been
made in freeing up the movement of goods, services, and
capital but the international movement of labor remains
restricted. The free movement of workers within countries
has long been one of the strengths of market economies.
When substantial deposits of petroleum became accessible in
North Dakota (USA), economic activity picked up greatly
attracting large numbers of workers from less prosperous
parts of the United States and easing the labor shortages that
had arisen with the onset of the oil boom (Healy, 2016).
Similar benefits to both receiving and sending nations would
become available if there were fewer barriers to the global
movement of labor resources. Milanovic (2016, p. 132) notes
that global inequality is much greater than the inequality
found within nations due primarily to the large “citizenship
premium” received by those born in high-income countries.
He argues that rapid increases in average incomes in poor
countries combined with greater migration could reduce the
citizenship premium and the level of global inequality but
recognizes that allowing greater international migration is
controversial and likely to be resisted strongly by many in
high-income countries. Immigration was a prime motivation
for those in the United Kingdom voting to sever ties with the
EU as well as a stimulus for the nativist political movements
that have sprung up in Europe and for the election of Donald
Trump in the United States.

Conclusion
Most of the work reviewed in this article supports the idea
that population growth is an important factor in overall
economic growth and may even contribute to increased
growth in per capita output in some cases. In low-income
countries, rapid population growth is likely to be detrimental in the short and medium term because it leads to large
numbers of dependent children. In the longer run, there is
likely to be a demographic dividend in these countries as
these young people become productive adults. It has also
been argued that population growth induced by high levels
of fertility, as is often the case in low-income countries,
can reduce general well-being in contrast to growth resulting from declines in mortality rates generally believed to
have more benign impacts on savings and economic

SAGE Open
growth. In high-income countries, population growth is
low and in some cases negative giving rise to age structures with a high proportion of elderly people in the population. The burden of supporting a large number of retired
people could be eased if population growth were higher in
these countries but it does not appear likely that fertility
rates will increase in the future or that mortality rates will
fall much below current levels. As a result, the natural population growth rate is likely to be very low. The U.S.
Census Bureau (2017) predicts that annual natural population growth in high-income countries will be –0.3% by
2050. Increased migration from low- to high-income countries could offset these low and negative natural population
growth rates while alleviating some of the pressures of
high population growth in low-income countries. Although
not directly affected by migration, an additional advantage
of higher population growth in high-income countries is
that it reduces the effects of inherited wealth on economic
inequality (Piketty, 2014, p. 83). Higher population growth
is generally associated with larger families and large families will have to divide inheritances among more children.
Inherited wealth is an important part of the concentration
of capital which, Piketty (2014) shows, contributes to
greater economic inequality.
There are still many who take exception to conclusions
such as these, arguing that the world is currently overpopulated putting unsustainable strains on resources and the environment. The president of “Negative Population Growth,
Inc.” argues that policies to reduce the world’s population are
crucial in realizing a human population that can be sustained
indefinitely (Mann, 2015). Most of those who believe the
world is overpopulated focus on the potential exhaustion of
vital resources such as farmland, water, and raw materials.
The implicit assumption in these analyses is that future technological innovations will be unable to overcome resource
scarcities created by the needs of the growing population
without causing environmental damage. In the case of natural resources, it is expected that technological innovations
will be directed toward creating substitutes as the resources
become scarce and their prices rise. In other words, rising
prices for petroleum and other natural resources are likely to
stimulate innovations that will solve many of the problems
generated by the increasing scarcity that will lead to the rising prices. In the case of fossil fuels, many would agree that
increasing the costs associated with their use either as a result
of scarcities or through taxation or other price-enhancing
policies would have significant benefits in reducing the
greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change.
There may be limits to the ability of market forces and technology to overcome potential resource constraints or to protect such environmental goods as clean air and water but it
would be wrong to think that human ingenuity is completely
impotent when it comes to creating a sustainable environmental future without severe population reductions. This is
good as dramatic reductions in the size of the global
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population are highly unlikely short of widespread nuclear
conflict or unusually deadly disease outbreaks.
Recent technological innovations in food and agricultural
production offer an encouraging example. Conservation
practices such as no-till farming which can reduce soil erosion and chemical runoff, precision farming which allows
more exact applications of chemical fertilizers and pesticides
reducing the quantities required, and other environmentally
benign management practices have been widely adopted
around the world without significant sacrifices in total food
production or farm incomes (Derpsch, Friedrich, Kassam, &
Hongwen, 2010; Thakur, Kassam, Stoop, & Uphoff, 2016;
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2016). Even such widely
decried technological innovations as those created by genetic
engineering can give rise to crop varieties that require fewer
chemical inputs and reduce the impact of agriculture on the
environment (Hamilton, 2009). It is almost certain that world
population will reach 10 billion over the next 50 years and as
these people will have higher incomes on average than is the
case today, food demand is expected to increase dramatically. Meeting this increased demand without causing irreversible damage to the environment may be challenging but
the rapid adoption of more sustainable agricultural practices
currently under way suggests that this is not an insurmountable task.
Mann (2015) also calls for greater limitations on immigration which is seen as part of the unsustainable population
growth in high-income countries. The main argument against
immigration raised in these countries is that immigrants
accept lower wages than native-born workers who are displaced by the influx of new workers (Frum, 2015). This popular understanding of the impact of immigration is bolstered
by academic work done by George Borjas who argues that
immigration into the United States depresses wages of lowskilled workers although it does contribute to increases in
GDP (Borjas, 2013). Other analysts find that immigration
generally has positive effects on income growth and productivity with limited displacement of low-skilled workers
(Boubtane, Coulibaly, & Rault, 2013; Mason 2014; Peri,
2012). The positive effects of immigration in high-income
countries are greater if the immigrants are highly-skilled
(Chojnicki & Ragot, 2016; Kerr, Kerr, Ozden, & Parsons,
2016) but even immigrants with limited skills are often able
to make significant economic contributions. The positive
economic impacts of migration may not be sufficiently compelling to counter the political opposition these human movements engender, however. The arrival of large numbers of
immigrants can upset traditional social systems leading to
cultural conflict as well as economic anxieties. While the
world economy could plausibly benefit from more open borders, the prevalence of anti-immigration political movements
in Europe and other high-income countries makes it unlikely
that the global movement of people will be as free as the
global movement of goods, services, and capital any time
soon.

Given the likely evolution of the global population and
the fairly low expectations that many have for per capita
growth in output, Piketty’s worry that the rate of return to
capital will be higher than the economic growth rate leading
to increasing concentration of wealth and greater inequality
seems warranted. This problem would be less severe if the
rate of return to capital were to decline to levels below the
current 3% to 4% suggested by Piketty. One would expect
this return to decline as greater amounts of capital are
amassed which may account in part for Piketty’s estimate
that current returns are lower than those of the 19th and early
20th century. Baker et al. (2005) argue that returns to capital
are related to the state of the economy so that low economic
growth will lead to lower returns to capital. If this is correct,
the problem posed by Piketty’s inequality may be at least
partially self-correcting. In any case, economic growth will
remain important in the 21st century for at least two reasons.
First, if Piketty’s analysis is correct, slow economic growth
may continue to be a factor in rising inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth. Second, economic growth in
low-income countries is crucial for raising living standards
and reducing global disparities between the more prosperous
industrialized countries and those in which poverty and low
standards of living are still rife (Milanovic, 2016). Because
population growth plays an important role in overall economic growth, the evolution of world population will continue to be a major global concern.
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